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Abstract
Cross-cultural differences in argumentation may be explained by the use of different 
norms of reasoning. However, some norms derive from, presumably universal, math-
ematical laws. This inconsistency can be resolved, by considering that some norms of 
argumentation, like Bayes theorem, are mathematical functions. Systematic variation 
in the inputs may produce culture-dependent inductive biases although the function 
remains invariant. This hypothesis was tested by fitting a Bayesian model to data on 
informal argumentation from Turkish and English cultures, which linguistically mark 
evidence quality differently. The experiment varied evidential marking and informant 
reliability in argumentative dialogues and revealed cross-cultural differences for both 
independent variables. The Bayesian model fitted the data from both cultures well but 
there were differences in the parameters consistent with culture-specific inductive 
biases. These findings are related to current controversies over the universality of the 
norms of reasoning and the role of normative theories in the psychology of reasoning.
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Cross-cultural studies of reasoning and argumentation are important to two 
fundamental debates in the psychology of reasoning and thinking. First, what 
is the role, if any, of normative theories — theories of how we should or should 
not reason — in the psychology of reasoning (Elqayam & Evans, 2011; Elqayam 
& Over, 2016)? Second, do cultural differences, for example, individualistic 
western cultures vs collectivist Eastern cultures, lead to fundamentally differ-
ent ways of thinking and reasoning (Mercier, 2011, 2013; Mercier, Zhang, Qu, 
Lu, & Van der Henst, 2015, Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng, & 
Nisbett, 1999)? Both debates pose the question, are there universal norms of 
reasoning (Mercier, 2011; Oaksford, 2014)?
However, norms come in different forms (Corner & Hahn, 2013). In par-
ticular, the norms governing informal argumentation have different origins 
which would be expected to bear on their universality (Corner & Hahn, 2013). 
Procedural norms (e.g., Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), like those govern-
ing courtroom proceedings, derive from social conventions (Corner & Hahn, 
2013; Hahn & Oaksford, 2012). Mathematical theories of logic and probability 
theory are the source of most epistemic norms (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007, 2012). 
Assuming that people’s behaviour respects these norms, these differing origins 
lead to different cross-cultural expectations. So, procedural norms, being based 
on social conventions, may be expected to vary across cultures.1 In contrast, 
epistemic norms, being based on, presumably universal, mathematical laws, 
may be expected not to vary between cultures. However, research looking at 
the effects of levels of evidence quality on argumentation, presumably under-
pinned by epistemic norms, has revealed differences (e.g., Hornikx & Hoeken, 
2007; Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013).
In this paper, we attempt to resolve this apparent inconsistency by consider-
ing that the norm, in this case, Bayes theorem, inheres in this theorem’s func-
tional form which dictates how evidence is combined. Consequently, while 
different cultures may systematically assign different values to the priors and 
likelihoods entering into the computation, these may be merely inductive bi-
ases (Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010), the norm, Bayes 
theorem, may be invariant. In this paper, we test this conjecture by fitting a 
Bayesian model of argumentation to data from two quite divergent cultures, 
Turkish and English. If the model fits the data equally well from both cul-
tures, we may interpret variation in the parameter values as reflecting culture-
specific inductive biases rather the adoption of different norms.
1  Although, to the extent that these procedures are intended to be truth conducive, it would be 
expected that cultures would converge on similar procedures. However, social conventions 
perform many other important functions that may override getting to the truth.
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Investigating Turkish-English differences is also of interest because these 
different linguistic cultures appear to mark evidence quality in different ways. 
One difference in evidence quality, which features strongly in courtroom pro-
cedures, is between eye-witness and hearsay evidence. In the formal setting 
of the courtroom, eye-witness testimony is regarded as of higher quality and 
as more persuasive than hearsay evidence. In Turkish, it is obligatory to mark 
this distinction in the morpho-syntactic structure of verbs in the past tense 
(Aikhenvald, 2004). In contrast, in English, marking this distinction (e.g., I saw 
that p vs I was told that p), is voluntary and lexical. That is, these linguistic 
cultures have different evidential systems (Aikhenvald, 2004), which have 
been argued to explain differences in cognitive processes between these cul-
tures. For example, Turkish participants seem to be more trusting of reliable 
sources of information (Lucas, Lewis, Cansu Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 2013) and 
more dismissive of indirect, hearsay evidence (Tosun, Vaid, & Geraci, 2013) 
than English participants (but see, Papafragou, Li, Choi, & Han, 2007; Ünal, 
Pinto, Bunger, & Papafragou, 2016). The experiment we report here is the first 
to investigate whether differences in the way linguistic cultures mark evidence 
quality differentially affects informal argument evaluation.
We first introduce the procedural and epistemic accounts of argumentation 
and in particular how Bayes theorem has been used to explain how people 
evaluate informal arguments. We then review cross-cultural research in in-
formal argumentation where evidence quality, for example, differences in ex-
pert opinion, has been varied. We conclude that the observed differences may 
be explained as inductive biases rather than by the employment of different 
norms. We then introduce the Turkish evidential system. We present the dif-
ferences in the perceived strength of arguments that it would predict for an 
experiment that varies both evidentiality and levels of expert opinion. In the 
Discussion, we trace out the relevance of this research to the recent debate 
about the role of normative theories in the psychology of reasoning (Elqayam 
& Evans, 2011; Elqayam & Over, 2016).
1 Argumentation
Argumentation is the social activity whereby someone attempts to persuade 
an audience of a, possibly controversial, position by providing a series of 
propositions in its support. In critical discussions, the caveat “before a rational 
judge” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 5) is usu-
ally added to emphasise that the argument should be persuasive with respect 
to some normative standard. Informal arguments are those that people often 
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find convincing but for which there is no formal, logical treatment. Many of 
the informal argumentation schemes identified since Aristotle have therefore 
earned the label “fallacies,” for example, the argument ad hominem (against 
the person) or the argument ad ignorantium (the argument from ignorance). 
However, many instances of these fallacies appear to be perfectly good argu-
ments (Hamblin, 1970). For example, while we may find the argument from 
ignorance in (1) persuasive, we may not be persuaded by the argument from 
ignorance in (2):
This drug is safe because there is no evidence that it is not (1)
Ghosts exist because no one has proved that they do not (2)
Consequently, the task has been to explain why some instances (2) are falla-
cious while others seem reasonable (1).
Two complementary normative approaches have been proposed to explain 
this difference, the procedural and epistemic approaches (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2012). Procedural approaches, for example, pragmadialectical theory (Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), provide procedural rules of engagement in a 
critical discussion like those that govern courtroom proceedings. Epistemic ap-
proaches use Bayes’ theorem to evaluate the degree to which arguments should 
change people’s subjective degree of belief in a conclusion (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007, 2012; Korb, 2004; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004; Zenker, 2013). In the procedural 
approach, fallacies arise because an interlocutor has used a discourse rule in 
the wrong context or the incorrect phase of an argument. However, even if 
both (1) and (2) occurred in the same phase of a critical discussion (i.e., the 
argumentative context), (1) would still be deemed stronger than (2) (Hahn & 
Oaksford, 2007).
The epistemic approach explains this difference using a content dependent 
measure of argument strength based on Bayes theorem (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2006, 2007). On this view, the reason that (1) is deemed stronger than (2) is 
due to the factors that influence the computation of the posterior probability 
using Bayes rule. So, people’s quantitative change in the degree of belief in a 
conclusion, C, brought about by an argument, a, is given by Equation 1 (where 
“¬” = not):
 (Eq. 1)
That is, the posterior degree of belief in the conclusion C given the argument 
a, Pr(C|a), is a function of the likelihoods, Pr(a|C) and Pr(a|¬C), and the priors 
Pr(Cǀa) = Pr(aǀC) Pr(C) + Pr(aǀ¬C) Pr(¬C)
Pr(aǀC) Pr(C)
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Pr(C). The specific content of the argument fixes these quantities. The pos-
terior (Pr(C|a)), provides a measure of argument strength. Regarding our ex-
amples, (1) may be considered stronger than (2) because people’s prior degree 
of belief that the drug is safe (Pr(C)) may be higher than their prior degree of 
belief in the existence of Ghosts. Moreover, people may believe that although 
there are highly sensitive (Pr(a|C) is high) and specific (1 – Pr(a|¬C) is high) 
tests for whether a drug is safe, similarly sensitive and specific tests for the 
existence of Ghosts are not available (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & 
Hahn, 2004).
The Bayesian account has also been extended to incorporate source reli-
ability (Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2009; Oaksford & Hahn, 2013). This extension 
can account for variations in expert opinion (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013), which 
we also varied in the study we report here. The odds version of Bayes theorem, 
factoring in the probability that a source is reliable, (Pr(R)), is:
 (Eq. 2)
When someone is an unreliable source of information, we assume they are 
equally likely to deploy the argument whether the conclusion is true or false, 
that is, Pr(a|C, ¬R) = Pr(a|¬C, ¬R) = .5 (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). So, when the 
source is completely unreliable (Pr(R) = 0), the likelihood ratio (LR) = 1, that is, 
there is no change in degree of belief, O(C|a) = O(C). On the other hand, when 
the source is completely reliable (Pr(R) = 1), then LR = Pr(a|C, R)/Pr(a|¬C, R).
2 Culture and Argumentation
Recent work on cross-cultural differences in argumentation has focused on 
evidence quality (Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007; Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013). The di-
mensions examined include statistical (high quality) vs anecdotal (low qual-
ity) evidence and evidence from experts with domain-relevant knowledge 
(high quality) vs experts with no domain-relevant knowledge (low quality). 
This research has shown that superficially quite similar, and geographically 
close cultures show marked differences in how high and low-quality evidence 
effects how persuaded they are of a conclusion. For example, French partici-
pants show less sensitivity to domain-relevant expert opinion than Dutch 
participants (Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007). This finding was explained by French 
students’ greater obedience to authority figures (Hornikx, 2011) and it has 
O(Cǀa) = .O (C)Pr(aǀ¬C, R) Pr(R) + Pr(aǀ¬C, ¬R)(1 – Pr(R))
Pr(aǀC, R) Pr(R) + Pr(aǀC, ¬R)(1 – Pr(R))
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been replicated for Dutch vs Indian participants (Hornikx, & De Best, 2011). 
Moreover, German participants are less sensitive to the quality of statistical 
evidence than Dutch participants (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013). This finding 
was consistent with German culture’s apparently higher levels of uncertain-
ty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001). However, individual measures of uncertainty 
avoidance did not correlate with the difference in the acceptability of high and 
low-quality arguments (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013).
Hornikx and ter Haar (2013), argue that their findings may arise because 
different cultures adhere to different norms. They suggest that “It is still an 
open question as to whether the norms are universal and people’s reactions 
to them are culture-dependent, or as to whether norms themselves may be 
culture dependent.” (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013, p. 498). As we have suggest-
ed, there are different normative accounts of argumentation, and these tend 
to depend on how the norms they postulate are justified (Corner & Hahn 
2013). Procedural norms, like those governing courtroom proceedings, are 
social conventions to which societies, over the course of their development, 
have assented to obey. It is difficult to conceive of such norms as universal 
standards obeyed by members of all cultures (Corner & Hahn 2013). In con-
trast, Bayesian argumentation has two routes to normativity. First, the self-
evidence of the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory which are used to 
derive Bayes theorem. Second, the Dutch book argument, which shows that 
following the rules of probability will prevent a rational agent making gam-
bles that would lead to sure losses (see, Corner & Hahn, 2013). It would seem 
hard to conceive of a culture in which avoiding sure losses is not something 
one ought to do (Oaksford, 2014).
However, the evidence we have just reviewed showed cross-cultural dif-
ferences in how persuasive members of different cultures find high and low-
quality evidence. What constitutes high and low-quality evidence is based on 
epistemic norms (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013), which are derivable from prob-
ability theory. For example, there is an obvious Bayesian account of statistical 
(50 trials) vs anecdotal (1 trial) evidence (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford 
& Hahn, 2004). Bayes theorem is a model of learning such that as each piece 
of positive evidence is used iteratively to update the posterior, it converges 
to 1. Moreover, as we have seen, source reliability can be incorporated into a 
Bayesian analysis (Hahn, Oaksford & Bayindir, 2005; Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 
2009; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2013). Experts with domain-
relevant knowledge are more reliable sources of evidence than experts with no 
domain-relevant knowledge. If argument quality, as investigated by Hornikx 
and ter Haar (2013), is underpinned by a universal Bayesian norm, then why 
were there clear cross-cultural differences?
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As we have observed, Bayes theorem is a mathematical function which 
prescribes how probabilistic sources of information should combine. It is nor-
mative for argument quality because (i) the more evidence that accrues in fa-
vour of a hypothesis the higher the posterior probability, and (ii) the higher 
the probability that a source is reliable, then, again, the higher the posterior 
probability. As a mathematical function, Bayes theorem only determines the 
relationship between the input and the output. So if either the prior, the like-
lihood, or the probability that the source is reliable go up, while the others 
stay the same, so does the posterior probability. Consequently, for any experi-
mental manipulation that a participant interprets as increasing, say, reliabil-
ity while not affecting the prior or the likelihood ratio, should, according to 
Bayes theorem, lead to an increase in the posterior and so to an increase in 
how persuasive they find the argument. However, Bayes theorem does not de-
termine the value of any of these input variables. So, some cultures may value 
expert opinion more than others, which we can capture as differences in Pr(R). 
But as long as they combine these values according to Bayes rule, each culture 
would still be respecting the appropriate epistemic norm. So, on this view, any 
cultural difference would be explained by culture-dependent inductive biases 
(Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010) rather than by the adop-
tion of different epistemic norms.
3 Evidentiality and Argumentation
As we have indicated, we chose to test this account of cross-cultural differ-
ences between Turkish and English cultures because they appear to differ in 
how they linguistically mark evidence quality. Two caveats are worth making 
at the outset.
First, there has been much discussion of the difference between obligatory/
morphological and voluntary/lexical marking of evidence in the literature on 
linguistic relativity (Gerrig & Banaji, 1994; Lucy, 1992; Robinson, 2009; Slobin, 
2003). However, it is difficult to determine whether a language has developed 
obligatory marking of evidentiality because it is important in that culture or it 
is important in that culture because the language has obligatory marking. We 
remain neutral on whether any cognitive differences are because of language 
differences or cultural differences.
Second, linguistic marking of evidence is not necessarily evaluative; it may 
just be informative. The reason natural languages have ways of marking evi-
dence may be just to inform about how the evidence was acquired. People do 
365Cross-Cultural Differences in Informal Argumentation
Journal of Cognition and Culture 18 (�018) 358–389
not interpret this information as conveying value judgements about the qual-
ity of the evidence. We resolve this question experimentally. If direct (eye-
witness) marking of evidence leads participants to assign higher argument 
strength to a conclusion, then one would have to conclude that such linguistic 
marking has an evaluative role. But we also note that it is conceivable that, 
in ordinary usage, the evidential system in one linguistic culture is purely in-
formative, but in another it is evaluative. We say “in ordinary usage” because 
in the Anglo-Saxon legal system (in the USA and UK) the rules of evidence 
strongly favour eye-witness over hearsay evidence. But this does not mean 
that, outside the formal context of the courtroom, people ordinarily treat this 
distinction as consequential.
The Turkish Evidential System. In Turkish, four verb suffixes are used to 
mark evidential distinctions (Aikhenvald, 2004). “–DI”2 marks evidence ac-
quired by direct perceptual experience. “–mIş” marks evidence acquired by in-
ference based on available evidence. “–(I)mIş” marks evidence acquired from 
someone else’s testimony. “–DIr” marks evidence acquired by deduction with-
out immediate evidence, that is, using prior knowledge (Lucas et al., 2013). An 
example from Lucas et al. (2013, pp. 579–580) makes these distinctions clear:
By way of example, in English, it is acceptable to make unqualified as-
sertions such as, “There was a storm.” In Turkish, however, it is obligatory 
also to mark whether the storm was directly witnessed (–DI), whether it 
was inferred from the aftermath (–mIş), whether one was told there was 
a storm (–(I)mIş), or whether general climate knowledge leads one to 
believe there should have been a storm (–DIr).
Work on linguistic relativity focuses on the possible effects of language dif-
ferences on non-linguistic processes. Turkish speaking children appear to 
successfully identify the correct source of a message at an earlier age than 
English-speaking children (Ögel-Balaban, Aksu-Koç, & Ercan, 2012). In adults, 
this effect seems to be due to the specific marking of sources in the evidential 
system (Tosun et al., 2013). For Turkish speakers, propositions encoded with 
2  In “–DI” / “–DIr”, the capital “D” indicates that it can take different values based on the conso-
nant harmony rule of grammatical suffixes: the consonant of the suffix changes to harmonize 
with the syllable-final consonant of the stem, “çarptı” (‘it crashed’) vs. “sevdi” (‘s/he loved’). 
Similarly, the capital “I” indicates that it can take different values based on the vowel harmo-
ny rule of grammatical suffixes: the vowel of the suffix changes to harmonize with the vowel 
of the preceding syllable (front/back or rounding harmony), “faydalıydı” (‘it was beneficial’) 
vs. “yeşildi” (‘it was green’), or “faydalıdır” (‘it is beneficial) vs. “yeşildir” (‘it is green’).
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— DI (i.e., direct evidence) showed better recognition and source memory 
than those encoded with — mIş (i.e., indirect evidence). English speakers 
showed no such differences in recognition or source memory when provided 
with lexically marked direct or indirect evidence. Moreover, Turkish children 
(pre-schoolers) seem to have an advantage over Chinese and English children 
in selective trust and false belief tasks (Lucas et al., 2013). Turkish children were 
more likely to trust a reliable informant than Chinese and English children, 
and they were more likely to pass false belief tasks. The habitual use of oblig-
atory evidential marking for Turkish speakers was hypothesised to sensitise 
Turkish speakers to attend to trustworthy sources of information (Lucas et al., 
2013). Turkish children also appear to resist misinformation better in a suggest-
ibility task (Gudjonsson, 1984) because they ignore information from indirect 
sources and attend to information from direct sources more than English chil-
dren (Aydin & Ceci, 2013). However, there have been failures to show source 
memory effects for Korean, which also has an obligatory evidential system 
(Papafragou et al., 2007), and for Turkish (Ünal et al., 2016) compared to English 
speakers.
In this study, as we have said, we are neutral on the question of linguistic 
relativity. We treat this linguistic difference in how evidence is marked in the 
same way as other researchers have treated the greater respect for authority 
shown by the French (Hornikx & Hoeken, 2007) and the higher uncertainty 
avoidance showed by Germans (Hornikx & ter Haar, 2013), compared to the 
Dutch. That is, we treat these differences as strongly suggestive that these cul-
tures will show differences in how they treat high and low-quality evidence 
in evaluating arguments. However, in the particular case of the different evi-
dential systems in Turkish and English, we can also linguistically manipulate 
whether evidence is direct or indirect and see if there are any differences in 
argument evaluation.
Anticipating some of our results, a pilot experiment, reported in the Method 
section, which concentrated solely on expert opinion, revealed cross-cultural 
English-Turkish differences. Turkish participants found arguments from ex-
perts more persuasive and arguments from lay people less persuasive than 
their English counterparts. This result rules out a possible pragmatic expla-
nation of our findings such that the English are simply more polite than the 
Turkish (Bhatia & Oaksford, 2015; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Leech, 1983; van 
Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009). This hypothesis can only push in one 
direction; it must predict that English participants will be more accepting of 
arguments from any source. So, it can explain why English participants were 
more accepting of arguments from lay people but not why they were less ac-
cepting of arguments from experts.
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4 Introduction to the Current Experiment
In this experiment, we used argumentative dialogues like the following (Hahn 
et al., 2005):
(3) Margaret:  Do you think clone technology is a threat to human 
beings?
 Anton:  I sort of believe that clone technology is not a threat to 
human beings.
 Margaret:  You can do more than sort of believe it; you can be certain 
that it is not a threat.
 Anton: Why do you say that?
 Margaret:  Because they apparently had an interview with a professor 
who is an expert in his field in an academic journal includ-
ing scientific studies. I gather the professor expressed his 
opinion considering that the long-term effects of cloning 
are not known to a great extent. According to him, it seems 
cloning was dangerous for human beings.
After the dialogue, participants were asked to rate how convinced Anton 
should now be that clone technology is a threat to human beings. We used 
a third-person argument evaluation paradigm (see, also Bhatia & Oaksford, 
2015; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004, 2013) because we did not want to confound 
participants’ own prior beliefs with those of Anton. Using these third-person 
judgments should dissociate participants’ assessments of the beliefs of an 
interlocutor in the experimental dialogues from their own prior beliefs. We 
hoped to ensure that participants would attend to the prior belief manipula-
tion (see next paragraph) rather than attribute their own prior beliefs to the 
relevant interlocutor in the dialogues (Anton in (3)). We tested this assump-
tion in a pre-test for the pilot experiment we report in the Method section.
The argument in (3) is a negative argument like the argument from igno-
rance in (1) (substituting “not toxic” for “safe”). We presented both negative 
and positive versions of these arguments. For positive versions, the strength of 
the argument, according to the Bayesian epistemic approach, Pr(C|a), is given 
in Eq. 1. Using the same parameters, Pr(a|C), Pr(a|¬C), and Pr(C), we can also 
compute the strength of a corresponding negative argument, Pr(¬C|¬a). We 
also manipulated one of the interlocuter’s, in this case, Anton’s, prior degree of 
belief in the conclusion. In (3), Anton has a weak prior degree of belief, he only 
“sort of believes” the conclusion initially. We also used the expression, “fairly 
convinced” to express a strong prior degree of belief.
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We introduced further manipulations in the final paragraph of this argu-
mentative dialogue from Margaret. This paragraph concerns a highly reliable 
source of information, a Professor in this field of research (expert opinion). 
Participants also evaluated arguments from sources with low, and medium-
reliability. For example, a TV street interview of a passing couple (lay opinion) 
would be expected to have low reliability. We can also mark the information 
provided by Margaret in the final paragraph as direct or indirect, morpho-
syntactically in Turkish or lexically in English. The example in (3) is marked 
as indirect. In the Turkish dialogues, the suffix –(I)mIş was used three times in 
the relevant verbs. In the English version in (3), following the advice in Göksel 
and Kerslake (2005), a comprehensive grammar of Turkish, the terms “appar-
ently”, “I gather”, and “it seems” were lexically incorporated in the text. We also 
included a neutral condition which was not marked for evidentiality. In the 
final statement in each dialogue, the speaker, here Margaret, appeals to a third 
person source of evidence. As the speaker is not asserting that they are the 
source of the evidence, it is not obligatory for them to mark how it was ob-
tained as they simply may not know. The neutral condition provides a control 
revealing the effect of source reliability independent of evidentiality markers. 
Having this control would not have been possible with a first-person report as 
the neutral case would have been ungrammatical.
5 Experimental Hypotheses
Previous research (e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Hahn et al., 2005; Oaksford 
& Hahn, 2004) has shown that people are sensitive to the factors predicted 
by Bayes theorem to affect how persuaded they are by arguments like those 
in (3). The first three predictions relate to replicating previous results. Bayes 
rule predicts that the degree of belief assigned to Anton after hearing the ar-
gument should be higher if he is already fairly convinced of the conclusion. 
So the higher the prior, the higher the argument strength. Moreover, as long 
as specificity is higher than sensitivity, positive arguments should be more 
persuasive than negative arguments (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & 
Hahn, 2004). Finally, an argument should be perceived as stronger the more 
reliable the source. Consequently, the first three experimental hypotheses 
were:
(H1) There will be a main effect of prior belief such that strong prior be-
liefs lead to higher argument strength than weak prior beliefs.
(H2) There will be a man effect of polarity such that positive arguments 
are perceived as stronger than negative arguments.
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(H3) There will be a main effect of reliability such that high > medium 
> low-reliability arguments (where “>” = has higher argument 
strength than)
If these three hypotheses are confirmed, then the experiment will have repli-
cated previous findings using similar argument forms. The next set of predic-
tions concern the new culture and evidentiality manipulations introduced in 
this experiment.
First, the existing evidence shows that Turkish people are more trusting of 
reliable sources and less trusting of unreliable sources than English people 
(Aydin & Ceci, 2013; Lucas et al., 2013; Tosun et al., 2013). However, some of 
this evidence derives from children, and it is a big jump to inferring adult per-
formance from such results. We therefore also conducted a pilot experiment, 
which, as we will see in the Method section, supported the following hypoth-
esis based on the prior observations with children:
(H4) Turkish participants will treat arguments from high-reliability 
sources as stronger than English participants, but they will treat 
arguments from low-reliability sources as weaker than English 
participants.
We pretested the third-party sources, appealed to the final paragraph of our di-
alogues, for reliability (see, Method section). For the medium-reliability group, 
we made no direct predictions.
Second, varying evidentiality, morpho-syntactically in Turkish and lexically 
in English, in a variety of paradigms (Aydin & Ceci, 2013; Tosun et al., 2013), 
appears to be ignored by English participants but leads to differential perfor-
mance for Turkish participants. We, therefore, made the following prediction.
(H5) While Turkish participants will treat arguments marked as from a 
direct source as stronger than from an indirect source, English par-
ticipants will not.
The purpose of the neutral control was to ensure that we could separate out 
the contributions of evidentiality and reliability on judgements of argument 
strength. We predicted that Turkish participants will treat the unmarked, neu-
tral case as the least persuasive.
Our final hypothesis concerns our original research question. Do these 
two diverse cultures employ the same epistemic Bayesian norm in evaluating 
these arguments? We addressed this question by fitting the Bayesian model in 
Equation 2 to these data.
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(H6) If the same epistemic norm is applied, we would expect to find 
equally good fits to the experimental data. However, we would not 
expect these different cultures to assign the same values to the 
various parameters of the model reflecting cross-cultural inductive 
biases.
6 Analysis Strategy
Our analysis strategy was to conduct an overall within subjects ANOVA with 
culture as a between-subjects factor and carry out planned contrasts to test 
our various hypotheses. However, the experiment used several different top-
ics and reliability manipulations resulting in twelve different set of mate-
rials, with each participant seeing only one set. Because of this variation in 
materials, we also double checked our results using a Bayesian linear mixed 
effects regression model implemented in the rstanarm package in R (Gabry 
& Goodrich, 2016). We treated participants and materials as random effects 
and fitted the maximal random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & 
Tily, 2013). This model was unidentifiable using all five factors. Consequently, 
to assess the novel experimental hypotheses for reliability and evidentiality, 
we left out the prior and polarity factors (see, for example, Singmann, Klauer, 
& Beller (2016) for a similar approach to this issue). The maximal random 
effects model fitted was: Argument Strength ~ Evidentiality × Reliability × 
Culture + (Evidentiality × Reliability|Participant) + (Evidentiality × Reliability 
× Culture|Materials). These analyses used the relatively uninformative de-
fault priors for the stan_lmer function in the rstanarm package. We report 
the results of these additional analyses fully in the supplementary materials 
(Supplementary Materials 1: Main Experiment Bayesian Analysis). We only in-
troduce the Bayesian analysis if the results disagree on the predictions based 
on the experimental hypotheses.
7 Experiment
7.1 Method
Participants. The participants were 114 Turkish students (Female = 74, mean 
age = 19.03 years) from Başkent University (59 students) and Middle East 
Technical University (55 students), in Ankara, Turkey, and 100 native English 
speaking participants recruited via Prolific Academic (https://www.prolific.ac) 
and paid £3 for completing the experiment online (Female = 54, mean age = 
33.70 years). Online recruitment was restricted to those whose first language 
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was English, and who held U.K. or U.S. nationality. This experiment compared 
cultures rather than language users. Consequently, a mixed UK/US sample 
may be considered not to be a pure one culture sample. However, the demo-
graphics of the Prolific Academic database indicates that 71% of participants 
are from the UK and only 29% from the US. Moreover, it is unlikely that the UK 
and the US citizens, while culturally different along many dimensions, have 
evolved very different ways of regarding evidence, as expressed in their shared 
language, given that they share a common Anglo-Saxon legal framework.
The English speaking internet sample was on average 13.68 years older 
than the Turkish sample. However, anticipating the results, they showed less 
sensitivity to evidential distinctions than their younger Turkish counterparts 
when additional experience would predict greater sensitivity. There were 
more females in the Turkish than in the English sample. However, at 65% 
and 54% respectively this difference was unlikely to be consequential. The 
English sample was recruited over the Internet, whereas the Turkish sample 
conducted the study in class. However, even for demanding cognitive and 
perceptual experiments, there are no performance differences between self-
selected internet samples and traditionally recruited and/or lab-tested sam-
ples (Germine, Nakayama, Duchaine, et al., 2012). Moreover, as it was the only 
between subject variable, only language could be affected by differential drop 
out (Birnbaum, 2000). But there was no drop out in either sample. The differ-
ent modes of recruitment might lead to the two groups being differentially 
attentive. However, any such effect could go either way. On the one hand, the 
Turkish sample may be less attentive as they were distracted by the class set-
ting. On the other hand, the English internet sample may be less attentive as 
they were motivated by financial incentives and the desire to finish the task. 
Consequently, any such effects would be expected to counterbalance each 
other.
Design. The design was mixed, with 2 (prior belief: weak versus strong) × 2 
(polarity: positive versus negative) × 3 (source reliability: high, medium, low) 
× 3 (evidentiality: direct (–DI), indirect (–mIş), neutral) as within-subjects fac-
tors, and Culture (Turkish versus English) as a between-subjects factor. The de-
pendent variable was argument convincingness measured on an eleven-point 
convincingness scale 0 (not convinced at all) to 10 (totally convinced).
Pilot Experiment. A pilot experiment had three goals (for the complete ex-
periment see Supplementary Material 2: Pilot Experiment). First, to confirm 
that Hypothesis 4 had some credibility. Second, to trial materials for the main 
study. Third, to confirm that participants’ own priors did not interfere with the 
prior probability manipulation.
Two preliminary studies were carried out before the pilot experiment. First, 
33 other participants rated a range of materials, for example, they were asked 
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how beneficial they found clone technology. Topics were selected which had 
mean values in the mid-range, that is, topics that did not polarise opinions 
one way or the other so that both positive and negative arguments made 
sense for the same topic. Four dialogues were selected on the following top-
ics: the dangers of cloning, the dangers of globalisation, the efficacy of capital 
punishment, and the efficacy of using robots instead of hiring people in the 
workplace. The Turkish versions of these dialogues used “–DIr,” e.g., “faydalı 
değildir,” indicating the evidence is inferred from general knowledge. Second, 
four days before the administration of the pilot experiment, the same partici-
pants were presented with the conclusions of these dialogues, for example, 
“Cloning is beneficial for humanity.” They were then asked whether they agree 
on an 11-point Likert scale from not agree at all (0) to completely agreed (10) 
reflecting their own priors.
The third goal was confirmed. There was only one significant correlation, 
out of 16 possible, between participants’ own prior beliefs and those they at-
tributed to the relevant interlocutor in the dialogues. The second goal was also, 
largely, confirmed. These materials replicated previous studies (Hahn et al., 
2005; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004), that is, hypotheses H1 to H3, apart from an effect 
of polarity (H2). In particular, given the novel experiment hypotheses tested in 
the current experiment, there was a strong effect of reliability (H3). To assess 
the first goal, the results of this pilot experiment were compared to the results 
from Hahn et al. (2005). Turkish participants treated arguments from high-reli-
ability sources as stronger and arguments from low reliable sources as weaker 
than the English participants in Hahn et al.’s (2005) study (see, Figure 1). This 
comparison provided tentative support for Hypothesis 4. However, apart from 
the clone technology topic, different materials were used in Hahn et al. (2005) 
and the pilot study. In the current experiment, the same materials were used 
in both language groups.
Materials. The materials were the same as those trialled in the pilot experi-
ment except that, in the current experiment, they included — DI suffixation, 
e.g., -faydalıydı, and — mIş suffixation, e.g., -faydalıymış, in the final paragraph. 
A neutral case was also included, e.g., -faydalı. Suffixation was introduced in 
the verbs in the closing statement of each dialogue where one interlocutor 
makes the primary argument for why the other should or should not believe 
the conclusion. Long sentences were split into two or three to include more 
instantiations of evidentiality markers in each dialogue to make them more sa-
lient. No lexical items or adverbs (e.g. güya [allegedly]) as signs of evidentiality 
were used to avoid confounding lexical effects with the effects of the morpho-
syntactic markers under investigation. (All the Turkish materials and English 
translations can be found in Supplementary 3: Experimental Materials).
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For the English translations of the neutral case, the evidential relationships 
were not stated. In the indirect case, all these evidential relations were marked 
as indirect. As in (3), the terms “apparently”, “I gather”, and “it seems” were 
used in place of the three occurrences of the indirect marker used in Turkish 
(see, Göksel and Kerslake, 2005). Three different lexical items were included 
expressing indirect evidence because using one term repetitively in English 
sounded infelicitous. In the direct case, it was made clear that the sources car-
ried out the study and are reporting on their own direct observations or results. 
The description is in the past tense and with factual modality. All translations 
were checked with Turkish-English bilinguals on the research team.
Source Reliability. In this experiment, in addition to high and low-reliability 
sources, a medium-reliability source was also introduced. This source was felt 
necessary to avoid possible ceiling effects of reliability such that there was no 
room to see effects of the evidentiality markers. A survey study was therefore 
conducted before the experiment, to identify information sources with varying 
levels of reliability. 35 participants, all native speakers of Turkish currently liv-
ing in Turkey, were contacted by e-mail and requested to list as many sources 
of information as possible under three categories: the most reliable, moder-
ately reliable, and least reliable. To see if the three categories identified in the 
survey differed 45 students (Mean Age = 19; SD = 0.8) from Çankaya University, 
were asked to rate 15 items (see Appendix A) from this pool for reliability.
Students’ ratings confirmed the e-mail results and the categorisation of in-
formation sources with just two differences. The item “local newspapers” was 
FIGURE 1  
Mean argument strength for 
positive and negative arguments 
in high and low-reliability 
conditions with strong and 
weak prior beliefs in the pilot 
experiment (Turkish) and in 
Hahn et al.’s (2005) data (English). 
Error bars are 95% Highest 
Density Intervals.
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0.65
0.60
strong weak
Prior
M
ea
n 
Ar
gu
m
en
t S
tre
ng
th Polarity
negative
English Turkish
positive
low
high
strong weak
374 Karaslaan et al.
Journal of Cognition and Culture 18 (�018) 358–389
placed in the medium-reliability category and the item “poll/survey compa-
nies” was placed in the low-reliability category. The mean reliability ratings are 
shown in Appendix A.
When appropriately reclassified, there were significant difference between 
all levels of source reliability: the high reliability category (mean = 7.16, SE = 
0.30) was found to be significantly more reliable than the medium-reliability 
category (mean = 4.87, SE = 0.45) and both categories combined were found 
to be significantly more reliable than the new low reliability category (Mean = 
2.78, SE = 0.26), F(2, 14) = 38.11, p <.0001. All three levels were used in this exper-
iment. Sources were selected from the list in Appendix A in each category and 
combined with topic to provide three different versions of each topic using 
different high, medium, and low-reliability sources. So there were effectively 12 
different sets of materials.
The inclusion of a medium-reliability level would have meant that partici-
pants had to evaluate 144 dialogues, which was considered excessive and likely 
to lead to fatigue effects. We, therefore, treated materials as a between-subjects 
variable. Each participant saw all thirty-six conditions of interest but with only 
one of the combinations of topic and information sources.
Procedure. For the Turkish speaking participants, the dialogues were pre-
sented in a booklet. Participants rated the extent to which one of the interlocu-
tors should now believe the conclusion. The booklet took about 20 minutes to 
complete, and participants were tested during their classes (without talking to 
each other) in the presence of their instructors and the experimenter. Before 
the experiment, participants signed an informed consent form. For the English 
participants, the dialogues were implemented in Qualtrics (https://www.qual-
trics.com/), and participants conducted the study online with participants re-
cruited via the Prolific Academic platform (https://www.prolific.ac/).
7.2 Results
We first converted the argument convincingness rating scale into the 0–1 
probability scale.3 This scale was used because we subsequently modelled the 
data and converting means that we can report the results of the data analysis 
and modelling on the same scale. We first conducted a mixed ANOVA with 2 
(prior belief: weak versus strong) × 2 (polarity: positive versus negative) × 3 
3   To make this conversion the ratings were transformed by adding ten and dividing by 20. One 
of the interlocuters was always initially described as believing the conclusion, whether it was 
a negative (¬C) or a positive (C) argument, i.e., the lowest value the prior could take was .5. 
Consequently zero on this rating scale is the midpoint, i.e., corresponding to 0.5, on the prob-
ability scale. The same transformation was applied in Hahn and Oaksford (2007).
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(reliability: high, medium, low) × 3 (evidentiality: direct (–DI), indirect (–mIş), 
neutral) as within-subjects factors and culture (Turkish versus English) as a 
between-subjects factor.
Hypothesis 1: Priors. There was a main effect of prior belief. When the prior 
was strong (Mean = .706, SE = .006, 95% CI [.694,.719]), argument strength (the 
posterior degree of belief) was higher than when it was weak (Mean = .690, SE 
= .006, 95% CI [.679,.701]), F(1, 212) = 48.98, MSe = .01, η2 = .19, p <.0001. This 
effect was replicated for Turkish participants (Strong: Mean = .690, SE = .008, 
95% CI [.673,.707]; Weak: Mean = .671, SE = .007, 95% CI [.657,.685]); F(1, 113) = 
27.13, MSe = .01, η2 = .19, p <.0001), and for English participants, (Strong: Mean 
= .723, SE = .010, 95% CI [.704,.742]; Weak: Mean = .709, SE = .009, 95% CI 
[.691,.727]); F(1, 99) = 24.21, MSe = .01, η2 = .20, p <.0001).
Hypothesis 2: Polarity. There was a main effect of polarity. When the ar-
gument was positive (Mean = .708, SE = .006, 95% CI [.695,.720]), argument 
strength was higher than when it was negative (Mean = .689, SE = .006, 95% 
CI [.677,.701]), F(1, 212) = 21.94, MSe = .03, η2 = .09, p <.0001. This effect was 
replicated for English participants (Positive: Mean = .733, SE = .010, 95% CI 
[.713,.754]; Negative: Mean = .698, SE = .010, 95% CI [.680,.717]); F(1, 99) = 20.76, 
MSe = .05, η2 = .17, p <.0001), but it was not for Turkish participants (Positive: 
Mean = .682, SE = .008, 95% CI [.667,.697]; Negative: Mean = .679, SE = .008, 
95% CI [.664,.695]); F(1, 113) < 1), although the trend was in the right direction.
Hypothesis 3: Reliability. As predicted there was a significant linear trend 
for reliability. When reliability was high (Mean = .794, SE = .007, 95% CI 
[.780,.808]), argument strength was higher than when it was medium (Mean 
= .657, SE = .007, 95% CI [.643,.670]), which was higher than when it was low 
(Mean = .644, SE = .006, 95% CI [.630,.657]), F(1, 212) = 373.99, MSe = .02, η2 
= .64, p <.0001. The quadratic component was also significant, F(1, 212) = 332.81, 
MSe = .02, η2 = .61, p <.0001, indicating that, for these materials, as reliability 
reduces, its effects on the posterior level off quite rapidly. All pairwise com-
parisons were signifciant at at least p <.0001. This finding was replicated for the 
Turkish participants (High: Mean = .802, SE = .010, 95% CI [.782,.822]; Medium: 
Mean = .628, SE = .009, 95% CI [.610,.645]); Low: Mean = .612, SE = .009, 95% 
CI [.595,.630]),]), Linear trend: F(1, 113) = 261.27, MSe = .02, η2 = .70, p <.0001; 
Quadratic trend: F(1, 113) = 233.49, MSe = .01, η2 = .67, p <.0001), and for English 
participants (High: Mean = .786, SE = .009, 95% CI [.768,.805]; Medium: 
Mean = .686, SE = .011, 95% CI [.664,.707]); Low: Mean = .676, SE = .011, 95% 
CI [.655,.697]),]), Linear trend: F(1, 99) = 127.73, MSe = .01, η2 = .56, p <.0001; 
Quadratic trend: F(1, 99) = 112.62, MSe = .01, η2 = .53, p <.0001). For both Turkish 
and English participants, all pairwise comparisons were significant at at least 
p <.05.
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These analyses confirmed Hypotheses 1 to 3 and replicated previous research 
using these argument forms (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Hahn et al., 2005; 
Oaksford & Hahn, 2004), apart from the lack of a significant polarity effect 
for Turkish participants. However, neither the polarity nor the prior manip-
ulations were our primary focus. The polarity effects were also small, albeit 
detectable, in previous research using similar materials (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007; Hahn et al., 2005). Moreover, the trend was in the right direction. 
Consequently, we now focus on the novel predictions for reliability, evidenti-
ality and culture.
Figure 2 shows the mean argument strength for Turkish and English partici-
pants by evidentiality and by reliability showing the classical 95% confidence 
intervals in the upper panels. The lower panels show the results of the hier-
archical Bayesian analysis based on the posterior predictive sample derived 
from the maximal random effects model and show the 95% highest density 
intervals.
Hypothesis 4: Culture and Reliability. To test Hypothesis 4, we first car-
ried out planned contrasts comparing the two cultures at each level of reli-
ability (the values of the relevant means are shown above). For both low and 
FIGURE � Mean argument strength for Turkish and  
English speakers in high, medium, and low-
reliability conditions with direct, indirect,  
and neutral evidentiality. For the Classical  
statistical analysis, error bars are the classical  
95% confidence intervals. For the Bayesian  
analysis, error bars are the 95% highest  
density intervals.
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medium-reliability conditions, Turkish participants found the arguments signif-
icantly less convincing than English participants (Low: F(1, 212) = 21.74, MSe = .01, 
η2 = .09, p <.0001; Medium: F(1, 212) = 17.46, MSe = .01, η2 = .09, p <.0001). For 
the high reliability conditions, Turkish participants found the argument more 
convincing than English participants, but this result was not significant, F(1, 
212) = 1.21, MSe = .01, η2 = .01, p = .27). However, in the Bayesian analysis, the 
posterior probability that this difference in argument strength, δ, was zero or 
less was zero, within the accuracy reported in R (mean difference, δ = .015, HDI 
= [.007,.024], Pr(δ ≤ 0) = 0). The reason for the discrepancy is obvious from 
Figure 2. In the hierarchical Bayesian model, although the means are the same, 
because of shrinkage (Kruschke, 2010), the HDIs are a lot narrower than the 
classical confidence intervals (CIs). The HDI is the interval which includes 
the mean with a probability of.95 given the data, an interpretation that can-
not be given to classical CIs. So, these data provide support for Hypothesis 4. 
Moreover, on either analysis, English participants were not more convinced 
than Turkish participants in the high-reliability condition, thereby ruling out 
a general politeness explanation of these results (Bhatia & Oaksford, 2015; van 
Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009).
Hypothesis 5: Evidentiality. As predicted there was a significant linear 
trend for evidentiality. When evidentiality was marked as direct (Mean = .706, 
SE = .006, 95% CI [.694,.718]), argument strength was higher than when it was 
indirect (Mean = .701, SE = .006, 95% CI [.690,.713]), which was higher than 
when it was neutral (Mean = .688, SE = .006, 95% CI [.675,.700]), F(1, 212) = 
48.21, MSe = .002, η2 = .19, p <.0001. The quadratic component was also signifi-
cant, F(1, 212) = 6.49, MSe = .001, η2 = .03, p <.025, indicating that, for these ma-
terials, the effect on the posterior of the unmarked, neutral, case falls away 
rapidly compared to the two marked cases. All pairwise comparisons were 
signifciant at at least p <.05. This finding was replicated for the Turkish partici-
pants, apart from the quadratic trend (Direct: Mean = .694, SE = .008, 95% CI 
[.679,.710]; Indirect: Mean = .683, SE = .007, 95% CI [.669,.698]; Neutral: Mean 
= .664, SE = .008, 95% CI [.647,.680; Linear trend: F(1, 113) = 54.16, MSe = .003, 
η2 = .32, p <.0001; Quadratic trend: F(1, 113) = 3.11, MSe = .001, η2 = .03, p = .08). 
For Turkish participants, all pairwise comparisons were significant at at least p 
<.001. However, for English participants, neither trend was significant (Direct: 
Mean = .717, SE = .009, 95% CI [.699,.735]; Indirect: Mean = .719, SE = .009, 95% 
CI [.701,.737]); Neutral: Mean = .712, SE = .010, 95% CI [.692,.731]; Linear trend: 
F(1, 99) = 3.53, MSe = .001, η2 = .03, p = .063; Quadratic trend: F(1, 99) = 3.53, 
MSe = .001, η2 = .03, p = .070). Moreover, for English participants, none of the 
pairwise comparisons were significant, p >.076 for all comparisons.
The effects for the high reliability condition alone showed a significant in-
teraction between evidentiality and culture, F(2, 424) = 9.28, MSe = .01, η2 = .04, 
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p <.0001 (see, Figure 2). In particular, when evidentiality was neutral there was 
no difference in argument strength between Turkish and English participants. 
This pattern of interaction suggests that when reliability is high, Turkish par-
ticipants do not judge the source to be more reliable than English participants. 
Rather, in this condition, they find an argument more convincing than English 
participants because of the presence of the evidentiality marker.
These analyses confirmed Hypotheses 4 and 5. Turkish participants found 
arguments from high-reliability sources more convincing and arguments from 
medium and low-reliability sources less convincing than English participants. 
Moreover, only Turkish participants showed an effect of evidentiality. They 
found arguments with evidence marked as direct more convincing than argu-
ments with evidence marked as indirect and arguments with evidence marked 
as indirect more convincing than arguments when evidence was unmarked or 
neutral. We did not observe similar effects for English participants. The inter-
action for the high-reliability condition modified these hypotheses suggesting 
that the effect of culture in this condition was due to the presence of the mor-
pho-syntactic evidentiality markers. These results show that in Turkish, but 
not in English culture, marking evidentiality is treated evaluatively influencing 
how strongly one should believe the conclusion of an argument.
Hypothesis 6: Model Fitting. To test this hypothesis, we fitted the Bayesian 
model in Eq. 2 to the data. Previous model fitting for similar data (e.g., Hahn 
& Oaksford, 2007) only fitted the pooled data, that is, the means, which can 
lead to overfitting and a lack of generalizability to new data. Moreover, it does 
not allow comparisons between the parameters of the model. We, therefore, 
adopted a cross-validation approach to address the issue of overfitting and also 
fitted the unpooled data for each participant. We used eleven free parameters 
to model the 36 data points for each participant. Separate sensitivity (Pr(a|C, 
R)) and specificity (Pr(¬a|¬C, R)) parameters were fitted for the three separate 
levels of evidentiality, making six parameters in all. We did this because we 
modelled the effects of evidentiality as affecting the likelihood ratio (Pr(a|C, 
R))/(1 - (Pr(¬a|¬C, R)). We also included three reliability (Pr(R), high, medium, 
low) and two prior degrees of belief parameters (Pr(C), weak vs strong). The 
priors were constrained such that Pr(C) or Pr(¬C) >.5. As we observed in de-
scribing the transformation to the probability interval (Footnote 3), the first 
interlocutor (e.g., Margaret in (3)) was always described as initially believing 
the conclusion to some extent (Pr(C) or Pr(¬C) >.5), rather than disbelieving it 
(Pr(C) or Pr(¬C) <.5). We used the optim function in R (Nash, 2014) to minimise 
the residual sum of squares between the model’s predictions and the data and 
computed the coefficient of determination,4 R2, as an index of fit.
4  R2 = 1 -  RSS 
TSS
 , where RSS = residual sum of squares and TSS = total sum of squares.
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For the cross-validation analysis, we used the random sampling or Monte-
Carlo method (Picard & Cook, 1984). We randomly split the data into two 
halves for both the Turkish and English speakers. One-half of each group was 
designated a training-set and the other half a test-set. The best fitting param-
eter values for the aggregate of the training-set were then computed. We used 
these parameter values to generate predictions which we evaluated against the 
aggregate of the test-set. The evaluation was carried out by computing R2 be-
tween the test-set and the predictions. We did this 2000 times for each language 
group. For Turkish participants, the mean R2 = .93 (SE = 0.001, median = .94). 
For English participants, the mean R2 = .80 (SE = 0.004, median = .86). The 
Bayesian epistemic model was able to account for a greater proportion of the 
variance in unseen data for Turkish than for English participants. Nonetheless, 
the model’s generalisation performance was good across both cultures.
Fitting the model to the unpooled data, for Turkish participants, the mean 
R2 = .73 (SE = 0.02, median = .78), and the fit was comparable for English par-
ticipants, mean R2 = .70 (SE = 0.02, median = .77). The fit was seemingly better 
for the Turkish participants. However, this result may arise from Turkish par-
ticipants’ greater sensitivity to source reliability, which has led to greater varia-
tion in their responses and so a higher total sum of squares and consequently 
a higher R2 (see, Footnote 5). We, therefore, calculated the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for each participant, assuming the residuals were indepen-
dent identical normal distributions with zero mean (Akaike, 1974; Burnham 
& Anderson, 2004).5 For AIC, if anything, the fit was better for English par-
ticipants (mean = -97.42, SE = 11.09) than for Turkish participants (mean = 
-89.03, SE = 12.44), that is, the mean AIC value was lower. In sum, the epis-
temic norm provided by Bayes theorem seems to adequately characterise how 
members of both cultures think people should revise their beliefs in informal 
argumentation.
The final question we addressed was whether the model’s parameters be-
haved as expected given the experimental manipulations and the finding of 
cross-cultural differences. Models can provide good fits to the data but not 
necessarily for the right reasons. For both cultures, the prior (Pr(C) or Pr(¬C)) 
was higher in the strong (Turkish: mean Pr(C) = .572, SE = 0.008; English: mean 
Pr(C) = .591, SE = .010) than in the weak prior belief condition (Turkish: mean 
Pr(C) = .549, SE = 0.006; English: mean Pr(C) = .575, SE = 0.009), Turkish: t(113) 
= 4.98, p <.0001; English: t(97) = 4.16, p <.0001. However, for the weak prior, Pr(C) 
was significantly higher for English than for the Turkish participants, t(210) = 
2.41, p <.025.
5   On this assumption, AIC = 2k + n.ln(RSS), where k is the number of parameters and n is the 
number of data points, that is, 12 and 32 respectively for each participant.
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We next looked at reliability, Pr(R). For both cultures, Pr(R) was significant-
ly higher in the high (Turkish: mean = .925, SE = .014; English: mean = .895, 
SE = .014) than in the moderate reliability condition (Turkish: mean = .299, 
SE = .026; English: mean = .412, SE = .032), Turkish: t(113) = 18.51; p <.0001, 
English; t(97) = 13.64, p <.0001. However, although Pr(R) was higher in the 
moderate than in the low reliability condition (mean = .242, SE = .033) for 
Turkish participants, t(113) = 2.53, p <.025, it was not for English participants 
(mean = .398, SE = .034), t(97) = .63, p = .53. There was no significant differ-
ence in Pr(R) between Turkish and English participants in the high reliability 
condition, t(210) = 1.59, p = .11, but it was significantly lower for Turkish than 
for English participants in the medium, t(210) = 2.73, p <.01, and in the low reli-
ability conditions, t(210) = 3.82, p <.0005. These differences are consistent with 
the presence of evidentiality markers being the cause of the higher argument 
strength for Turkish participants than English participants in the high reliabil-
ity condition.
We assumed that evidentiality affects the likelihood ratio (Pr(a|C, R))/(1 - 
(Pr(¬a|¬C, R)). We, therefore, computed the log-likelihood ratio, log10LR, for 
each evidentiality marker and for each participant.6 For Turkish participants, 
log10LR did not differ significantly between the direct (mean = 1.018, SE = .103) 
and indirect markers (mean = .993, SE = .096, t(113) = .25, p = .81), but both were 
significantly higher than in the neutral condition (mean = .666, SE = .077; di-
rect vs. neutral: t(113) = 3.63, p <.0005; indirect vs. neutral: t(113) = 3.30, p <.005). 
For English participants, none to these differences were significant (direct: 
mean = .912, SE = .080; indirect: mean = .828, SE = .072; neutral: mean = .791, 
SE = .082; direct vs. indirect: t(97) = 1.17, p = .24; direct vs. neutral: t(97) = 1.26, 
p = .21; indirect vs. neutral: t(97) = .45, p = .65). For the overall data, there were 
no differences between cultures. We therefore looked at the participants in the 
upper 50th percentile of R2 values (cut-off = .775). For this group, for direct 
and indirect markers, log10LR was significantly higher for Turkish participants 
(direct: mean = 1.320, SE = .150; indirect: mean = 1.184, SE = .150) than for the 
English participants (direct: mean = .791, SE = .100; indirect: mean = .668, SE 
= .100), direct: t(101) = 2.72, p <.005, indirect: t(101) = 3.04, p <.005. There was 
no significant difference for the neutral case (Turkish: mean = .697, SE = .098; 
English: mean = .639, SE = .083; t(101) = .43, p = .33).
The model that emerges is one in which, when there is no marking of evi-
dentiality, the likelihood ratio or measure of argument force (Hahn & Oaksford, 
6   We tested whether the log transformed variables were normally distributed using the 
Shapiro-Wilks test (Royston, 1995). For all three evidentiality markers, log10LR was normally 
distributed, W ranged between .70 and .81 and p < .0001 in each test.
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2007), is the same for Turkish and English participants. There is a monotonic 
increase in argument force, such that direct > indirect > neutral, for Turkish but 
not for English participants. While both cultures show a monotonic increase in 
Pr(R), such high > medium > low, Turkish participants assign much lower val-
ues of Pr(R) for medium and low-reliability sources than English participants. 
However, when reliability is high, they assign the same value of Pr(R). In this 
condition, the increase in argument strength for Turkish participants is caused 
by increased levels of argument force for the direct and indirect markers.
8 Discussion
Replicating previous research (Hornikx & Hoeken, 2011; Hornikx & ter Haar, 
2013), this study revealed significant differences in how two different cul-
tures, Turkish and English, evaluate informal arguments. However, fitting the 
Bayesian epistemic model to these data, showed that we could explain these 
differences by culture-dependent inductive biases rather than by these cul-
tures adopting different epistemic norms. These inductive biases consisted of 
Turkish participants being less trusting of low and medium-reliability sourc-
es than English participants, although both cultures were equally trusting of 
high-reliability sources. An ordering over evidentiality modulated this basic 
pattern, such that, direct > indirect > neutral, for Turkish but not for English 
participants. We first discuss possible explanations of the main findings. We 
then explore the implications for the two issues we outlined in the introduc-
tion concerning the universality of the norms of reasoning and argumentation 
and the role of normative theories in the psychology of reasoning.
That Turkish participants showed a monotonic increase in argument 
strength with evidentiality seems to be directly related to the Turkish language 
incorporating these distinctions morpho-syntactically rather than lexically 
as in English. Linguists like Everett (2013) view language as a cultural tool for 
communicating efficiently and effectively about the distinctions that a culture 
finds important (see also, Christiansen & Chater, 2016). It is a reasonable con-
jecture that the more important a culture finds a distinction, the more likely 
it is to become sedimented into the obligatory morphosyntactic structure of 
a language over the course of its evolution. As we argued in the introduction, 
however, we needed to empirically test whether evidential marking in a lan-
guage is evaluative or only informative. This experiment showed that Turkish 
culture treats the distinction between direct and indirect evidence evaluative-
ly. Evidence marked as direct led to greater increases in peoples degree of be-
lief in the conclusion of an informal argument than indirect evidence, that is, 
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in the Bayesian model, the fitted value of the likelihood ratio was higher. We 
observed no such effects for English participants.
Previous explanations of Turkish participants greater trust of reliable 
sources have focused on the notion that habitual and obligatory use of evi-
dential markers sensitises Turkish speakers to source reliability (Lucas et al., 
2013). However, our findings did not show that Turkish participants treated 
high reliable sources as any more reliable than English participants in an argu-
ment evaluation paradigm. The principal finding was that Turkish participants 
were far less trusting (lower Pr(R)) of medium and low-reliability sources than 
English participants. This result seems to show that English participants were 
more credulous or gullible than their Turkish counterparts. Social learning ap-
pears to depend on a degree of gullibility (Boyd & Richerson, 2007). It is vital 
to the intergenerational transmission of knowledge and skills that learners 
are relatively gullible and accepting of the instruction given by their elders. 
However, it is also important to maintain a degree of scepticism to avoid ac-
quiring silly beliefs (Kurzban, 2007). The balance between gullibility and scep-
ticism may vary between cultures predicting that English participants may be 
more open to learning from less reliable sources. That is, our results may gen-
eralise beyond argument evaluation to a range of learning tasks, an issue that 
we can address in future research.
These results suggest that the underlying epistemic norm provided by Bayes 
theorem may be universal for human argumentation. Of course, testing one 
norm between two linguistic cultures could not constitute an exhaustive test of 
the universality of this formal rational norm.7 However, in good falsificationist 
fashion (Popper, 1959), this experiment did put the hypothesis at risk, i.e., this 
is a critical test it has survived. Our results, therefore, bear on the debate over 
the universality of the principles of reasoning and whether particular cultures 
have fundamentally different ways of thinking and reasoning (Mercier, 2011, 
2013; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng, & Nisbett, 
1999). Nisbett and colleagues have argued that Western-individualistic cultures 
are more analytical and likely to apply rules of reasoning like the principle of 
non-contradiction and Bayes rule. Eastern oriental cultures are more likely to 
reasoning holistically and are much more tolerant of contradictions. Mercier 
(2011) has argued that, while some cross-cultural differences in reasoning exist, 
claims that formal norms of reasoning — derived from logic or probability 
theory — are not universal may not stand up to scrutiny. For example, appar-
ent differences between Eastern and Western cultures in their adherence to 
7   That is, it is derived from mathematical probability theory. Other informal norms, perhaps 
like those governing dialogical exchanges may not be universal.
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the principle of non-contradiction (Peng & Nesbitt, 1999) may be illusory. Both 
cultures seem able to apply this principle (Mercier, 2011; Mercier et al., 2015).
By fitting the Bayesian model of argumentation to these data, this study has 
shown that both Turkish and English cultures follow the same norm in infor-
mal argumentation but have different inductive biases. A similar model fitting 
approach might inform the debate over the principle of non-contradiction. 
The principle of non-contradiction is the foundation of logic, which is taken to 
underlie our analytic abilities. Mercier (2011) has cast the difference between 
Western and Eastern cultures in terms of modern dual process theories (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013), which distinguish between reflective, analytic processes 
and intuitive, heuristic processes. Recently, related dual source models have 
been fitted to reasoning data to tease out the relative contributions of reflec-
tive/logical and intuitive/knowledge-based reasoning in classical reasoning 
tasks (Singmann, Klauer, & Beller, 2016). These models include a parameter 
that reflects the relative weighting of these two reasoning processes. If non-
contradiction were not a factor in Easterners’ reasoning, we would expect the 
value of this parameter to be zero, indicating no analytic contribution to the 
reasoning process. Values intermediate between 0 and 1 indicate a mix of both 
styles of reasoning. We suspect that fitting such models to individual partici-
pants is likely to yield a lot of variation in the weighting parameter but that 
people from Western and Eastern cultures would both show intermediate val-
ues. However, Easterners may show a systematic tendency toward the low end 
indicating a lower involvement of analytic processes. This modelling approach 
is one that we can pursue in future research.
As we just observed, non-contradiction provides the intuitive foundation of 
formal logic: if you want to avoid contradictions, you should reason according to 
standard logic. The Dutch book theorems provide the intuitive foundation of 
probability: if you want to avoid making bets you are bound to lose, you should 
reason according to probability theory. These conditional formulations estab-
lish the instrumental rationality of logic and probability (Elqayam & Evans, 
2011). If you want to achieve these practical goals, this is how you ought to 
reason. Elqayam and Evans (2011), deny that the unconditional formulation, 
that is, you should reason according to probability theory, which is an evaluative 
normative claim, has any role in the psychology of reasoning. If there is more 
than one competing normative theory of a task, then we must decide between 
them empirically. But if we then treat the normative theory selected on this 
basis as an evaluative norm, one has committed the naturalistic fallacy (Moore, 
1903) of inferring an ought from an is, first stated in David Hume’s A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1739/2000). However, we often drop the instrumental condi-
tional formulation if the antecedent is considered universal (Oaksford, 2014). 
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For example, we believe that ripe apples should fall, and would evaluate an 
apple that did not fall as inedible. We would not feel compelled to formulate 
this claim as if gravity is in force, then ripe apples should fall, because gravity is 
in force universally in our experience. This experiment shows that the hypoth-
esis that avoiding bets one is bound to lose commands universal assent has 
withstood at least one attempted falsification. Belief updating in both Turkish 
and English cultures conformed to Bayes rule which is a trivial consequence of 
the Kolmogorov axioms that the Dutch book theorems are used to justify. We 
would argue therefore that evidence for the universality of a norm of reason-
ing is evidence for an evaluative norm, which, we argue, play an important role 
in the psychology of reasoning.
9 Conclusion
Despite clear cross-cultural differences in the effects of different linguistic 
marking of evidence and the reliability of an informant, in informal argumen-
tation, both Turkish and English participants combine this information using 
the epistemic norm provided by Bayes theorem. These results imply that Bayes 
theorem provides a universal norm of reasoning and argumentation. These re-
sults support recent proposals that many norms, in particular, those derived 
from logic and probability theory, are not relative to particular cultures, for 
example, Eastern or Western (Mercier, 2011; Mercier et al., 2015). The universal-
ity of these norms also suggests that they can be treated evaluatively in judg-
ing the quality of human reasoning. These conclusions are of course tentative 
as they stand in need of replication comparing a broader range of cultural 
differences.
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 Appendix
appendix a The reliability of the information sources used in main Experiment.
Information sources
Mean SDHigh reliability
1. Documentaries 7.97 1.51
2. Academic Scientific Publications 7.7 1.69
3. University Databases and Resources 7.17 1.99
4. Wikipedia 6.62 2.43
5. Regularly-followed authors/writers 6.35 1.73
Moderate reliability
6. Sci-Tech Sections of Newspapers 6.3 2.3
7. News Portals and Agencies 5.32 2.28
8. Local Newspapers
9. Regularly-followed Internet Forums
4.87
4.22
2.52
1.92
10. Facebook-Youtube-Twitter 3.62 2.61
Low reliability  
11. Poll/Survey Companies 3.45 2.14
12. GSM Operators 3.32 2.55
13. Political Parties 2.62 2.07
14. Politicians and Ministers 2.5 2.34
15. Internet Advertisements 2 1.92
